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Abstract
Effectiveness is a key criterion in assessing the justification of antibiotic resistance 
interventions. Depending on an intervention’s effectiveness, burdens and costs will 
be more or less justified, which is especially important for large scale population-
level interventions with high running costs and pronounced risks to individuals in 
terms of wellbeing, integrity and autonomy. In this paper, we assess the case of rou-
tine hospital screening for multi-drug-resistant Gram-negative bacteria (MDRGN) 
from this perspective. Utilizing a comparison to screening programs for Methi-
cillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA) we argue that current screening 
programmes for MDRGN in low endemic settings should be reconsidered, as its 
effectiveness is in doubt, while general downsides to screening programs remain. 
To accomplish justifiable antibiotic stewardship, MDRGN screening should not be 
viewed as a separate measure, but rather as part of a comprehensive approach. The 
program should be redesigned to focus on those at risk of developing symptomatic 
infections with MDRGN rather than merely detecting those colonised.
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1 Introduction
Antibiotic resistance (ABR) is widely considered to be a threat of global propor-
tions. Due to a combination of factors, such as overtreatment, veterinary use of 
antibiotics, pollution and lack of new classes of antibiotics, a situation is develop-
ing where existing treatment for currently relatively innocent infections, prophy-
lactic use in for example surgery, and treatment of the most vulnerable patients 
such as neonates and immunocompromised patients is jeopardized (Miller-Petrie 
et al. 2017; Teillant et al. 2015; Abbo and Ariza-Heredia 2014). ABR, therefore, 
presents a potential threat to the everyday functioning of healthcare (WHO 2015), 
and healthcare institutions should make considerable effort to limit this threat. 
Facing such grave prospects, it thus seems that drastic action is easily justified. 
However, ill-advised interventions bring risks of their own (Nijsingh et al. 2020), 
and policies that are perceived to be unfair or otherwise weakly justified may 
threaten the alliance between society and the public necessary to secure the aims 
of public health endeavours, such as antibiotic stewardship policies (Munthe et al 
2019; Munthe and Nijsingh 2019).
Most public health ethics frameworks agree that the values of effectiveness, 
fairness and proportionality are central to evaluating the design and implementa-
tion of specific and concrete measures, also regarding infectious disease control 
(Ten Have et  al. 2010; Verweij 2011). However, the problem in assessing ABR 
interventions is that although the biological mechanism underlying resistance is 
quite simple, the pathways of developing ABR are notoriously complex, and it is 
difficult to assess what interventions are worthwhile, especially considering that 
different interventions may interact. In this context, the problem of ABR has been 
called a ’(super-)wicked problem’ (Littmann and Viens 2015; Rump et al. 2018), 
a class of complex and intractable societal challenges for which it is notoriously 
difficult to assess the justifiability of interventions. In this paper, we will focus on 
one ABR intervention, namely routine hospital screening for colonisation with 
multidrug resistant Gram-negative bacteria (MDRGN). In particular, we will con-
sider multidrug resistant Enterobacterales, such as Escherichia coli (E. coli) and 
Klebsiella pneumoniae. In our discussion, we leave to one side multidrug resist-
ant Pseudomonas and Acinetobacter species, given the relevant differences in 
epidemiology, microbiology, transmission, and environmental persistence (WHO 
2017).
MDRGN screening is a standing policy in hospitals in Sweden and sev-
eral other countries with low prevalence of these bacteria. This policy includes 
patients who have been hospitalized abroad the previous 6  months (ECDC 
2011, 2016; CDC 2013; Wilson et  al. 2016; FoHM 2017a; Public Health Eng-
land 2020). We will use Sweden as a case in point, noting that arguments and 
conclusion are relevant for recommended and implemented hospital screen-
ing policies throughout Europe and North America. These screening programs 
not only include admission screening of patients hospitalised abroad but also 
those admitted to high-risk units such as intensive care, neonatal, haematology 
and transplant wards. This design has its origin in earlier screening for MRSA 
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(Methicillin-Resistant Staphylococcus aureus) and VRE (Vancomycin-Resistant 
Enterococci), but with the emergence of MDRGN the inclusion criteria have been 
extended accordingly, especially for carbapenemase-producing Enterobacterales 
(CPE). Recently, the Swedish screening policy has been extended to recommend 
screening for MDRGN in patients who have travelled to high-endemic countries 
for more than 2 months in the past 6 months (FoHM 2017a). Similar suggestions 
can also be found in the literature (Van der Bij and Pitout 2012; Paltansing 2013; 
Lübbert et al. 2015). Also, in new guidelines from Public Heath England screen-
ing recommendations have been considerably extended and screening is no longer 
limited to recent hospitalisation abroad (Public Health England 2020).
In the following, we explain what screening for multi-drug resistant colonisa-
tion involves and how it differs from screening with an eye to the risk of symp-
tomatic infection with multi-drug resistant bacteria.1 We also compare screening 
recommendations for MDRGN and MRSA in this light. We continue this compari-
son, assessing the effectiveness of screening in the light of known general ethical 
downsides of screening programs, and conclude that there are some significant 
differences between these pathogens, which should prompt reconsideration of the 
MDRGN screening policy: A fair and proportional policy with regard to MDRGN 
needs to focus on patient risk-factors of developing subsequent symptomatic infec-
tion with these bacteria, for instance recurrent urinary tract infections, not colonisa-
tion as such. To secure general safety, we suggest that such a justifiable ABR screen-
ing should be combined with other, well established primary prevention infection 
control strategies.
2  Screening for multi‑drug resistant bacteria
Multidrug resistant (MDR) bacteria pose a significant threat to society in general 
and the safe application of medical care in particular. As drug resistance rises, 
healthcare-associated infections become an increasing threat to medical practice, 
because infections caused by MDR bacteria are associated with higher incidences 
of mortality and prolonged hospital stay (Cassini et al. 2019; De Kraker et al. 2011). 
The prevention of MDR outbreaks is therefore of great importance to the proper 
functioning of healthcare institutions, such as hospitals and nursing homes. Health-
care institutions have various tools at their disposal to combat this threat, such as 
increased hygiene precautions and antibiotic stewardship (Tacconelli et  al. 2014). 
One very powerful tool is the knowledge provided by surveillance. Specifically, 
1 In this paper we distinguish between colonisation on the one hand, and symptomatic infection on the 
other. Colonisation refers to a state where the person infected by a pathogen does not display symptoms, 
whereas symptomatic infection refers to the state where the state of the infection causes discernable 
symptoms (i.e. damage) to the person. We will sometimes use’carrier state’ as synonymous to coloni-
sation and’symptomatic infection’ for’infectious disease’. Where nothing hinges on the difference, we 
sometimes use just’infection’. See Casadevall and Pirofski (1999) for a more thorough discussion of the 
relevant terminology.
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screening of patients can provide information that enables institutions to take pre-
ventative action, such as contact precautions.
Sweden has been a forerunner in successful policies to manage the threat of anti-
biotic resistance (Mölstad et al. 2017), and has implemented an active “search and 
destroy” screening policy to manage this threat in healthcare.2 Patients at risk of 
being colonised with MRSA at admission to hospital have routinely been screened 
for colonisation since 2000. In 2007, Vancomycin-Resistant Enterococci were added 
to the list of reportable multidrug resistant bacteria, as well as the multidrug resist-
ant Gram-negative bacteria (MDRGN), such as the gut bacteria Klebsiella pneumo-
niae and E. coli that produce Extended-Spectrum Beta-lactamases (ESBLs) and/or 
carbapenemases (FoHM 2017a). These bacteria are resistant to our most valuable 
and most used antibiotics. The guidelines for MDRGN adopt similar criteria as for 
MRSA. Given the seriousness of the threat, this expansion of attention is under-
standable: MDRGN are on the rise globally (Karanika et  al. 2016; Cassini et  al. 
2019), which increasingly poses problems in terms of morbidity and mortality (Tac-
conelli et al. 2014; Trecarichi and Tumbarello 2017). Considering the lack of treat-
ment choices for serious infections with these pathogens (Trecarichi and Tumbarello 
2017), this development should be taken as a serious threat to the health of patients 
at special risk of MDRGN symptomatic infection.
However, as mentioned, the updated guidelines also recommend screening for 
additional patient groups, in particular travellers to high-endemic regions. This, too, 
appears to make sense at first sight. Many patients, particularly those who visit high-
endemic countries, are colonised by MDRGN (Woerther et al. 2017). A large pro-
portion of people in Sweden travel to high-endemic regions, such as South Asia, and 
traveller studies suggest that approximately one third are carriers of MDRGN upon 
return (Vading et al 2016; Woerther et al. 2017). They may therefore be considered 
‘high risk’ with respect to MDRGN colonisation. However, we will argue that from 
an institutional as well as from an individual patient perspective there are reasons 
to treat MDRGN colonisation differently from MRSA colonisation. Using identical 
inclusion criteria for MDRGN screening as in the case of MRSA and expanding it to 
also include recent travel to high-endemic settings makes the program inadequately 
adjusted to the epidemiological characteristics of MDRGN, resulting in insufficient 
effectiveness to justify the program in light of its downsides, thus failing the public 
health ethical criterion of proportionality.
3  Ethics and effectiveness
Screening programs are generally known to produce specific downsides such as high 
running costs, and risks to individuals in terms of patient autonomy, stigma and the 
risk of a false test result (Juth and Munthe 2012). Such downsides (to be elaborated 
further below) must therefore be demonstrably balanced by public health benefits to 
be justified. Routine hospital screening for MDR bacteria generally involves little, if 
2 Another example of a very pro-active, and on the face of it successful, search and destroy policy is in 
the Netherlands (Wertheim et al. 2004; Bootsma et al. 2006).
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any, consent, since it is a part of mandatory hospital infection control policies, illus-
trating that the effectiveness needed to justify the program is expected to be in terms 
of public health and safety.3 If the program is sufficiently effective in this regard, the 
downsides for individuals could be justified by holding them out as regrettable but 
necessary side-effects of a proportional policy to protect potential victims of MDR 
infection, and the institutions that provide care for them. Whether or not a screening 
program is sufficiently effective to be proportional depends, among other factors, on 
the treatment options, the prevalence of the condition screened for, and the specific-
ity and sensitivity of the test (Nijsingh et al. 2017).
Public health ethics frameworks tend to place a heavy emphasis on effectiveness 
and proportionality (Bensimon and Upshur 2007; Childress and Bernheim 2003; ten 
Have et al. 2010). Effectiveness in this context is not just a cost–benefit consideration, 
but includes moral requirements that stem from the tension that arises when individual 
claims are put under pressure in the context of weighty public health concerns. Most, 
if not all, large scale public health interventions involve some sort of trade-off between 
various individual and collective interests (Holland 2007). Given the vulnerability 
of the individual in such contexts, public health ethical frameworks tend to empha-
size the importance of thoroughly analysing and comparing alternative strategies, so 
that any infringement of individual claims are justified by being reasonably effective 
for enhancing public health without being unnecessarily intrusive or harmful.4 The 
constraint of proportionality and the weight it places on effectiveness is a safeguard 
against unnecessary harm and injustice, and to ensure that individual claims are not 
brushed aside too lightly in the face of massive threats. In addition, effectiveness is 
essential for justifying the opportunity costs of any large public health effort, that is, 
the resources spent on this effort rather than other important actions.
To determine the extent to which the screening policy with respect to MDRGN 
is sufficiently effective to meet the proportionality condition, it is illustrative to 
first consider the practice of screening for MRSA.5 Not least since the downsides 
3 This makes the ethical assessment of hospital screening for MDRGN colonization different from the 
assessment of screening programs where there are potential benefits to individual patients (such as new-
born screening programs), or when the aim of the program is to enhance patient decision-making, such 
as prenatal screening programs (Juth and Munthe 2012, ch. 2–3), and where communicable disease man-
agement measures are not among the options. While a comparative ethical analysis with such programs 
would be interesting indeed, in this article we are focusing on the ethical evaluation of MDRGN coloni-
zation hospital screening in its own right. We do, however, expand on some general public health ethical 
considerations with regard to the limited room for informed consent and voluntariness in the kind of 
screening under consideration.
4 There is some technical debate regarding how the condition of unnecessary intrusion and harm should 
be read. While Childress and Bernheim (2003) formulate a strict necessary condition of minimal intru-
sion, Grill and Dawson (2017) have argued for a more balanced approach, where the resulting framework 
does not give any special priority to the value of liberty and comparison of alternatives involves taking 
into account all relevant values. However, this debate will not affect the soundness or validity of the 
argument pursued in the present paper, since our focus is on effectiveness, not an application of the harm 
principle, or the least intrusion principle. See "Concluding discussion".
5 It should be noted that the case for VRE, which is also a screening target in Sweden, is slightly differ-
ent from that for MRSA. VRE is mostly a gut-coloniser, which can be found causing urinary tract infec-
tions, gallbladder infections and endocarditis—but they are rare pathogens and particularly dangerous to 
weak and immunocompromised patients. In most of what follows, we leave discussion of this to one side 
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for individual patients may be assumed to be similar (see further below). The cur-
rent Swedish policy to screen for MRSA has been successful in containing the 
spread of hospital acquired infections, but not uncontroversial (Diekema and Climo 
2008; Skyman et al. 2010; Skyman 2014; Rump 2016; Wenzel et al. 2008; Edmond 
et al. 2008). Before moving on to our main point, we will first give a short critical 
appraisal of the screening programme for MRSA and the considerations that play a 
role in structuring the policy.
MRSA screening is not applied universally,6 and universal screening is rarely 
advocated, because of the burdens and costs to individual patients and the difficulty 
of justifying the opportunity costs for the health care system as a whole (Collins 
et al. 2011). Rather, specific screening is performed on high-risk target groups, for 
example, patients with an active wound infection and patients who indicate that 
they have previously been admitted to a hospital with known outbreaks, or who 
have spent time in high-endemic settings. In case of a positive MRSA test, the 
patient is registered as carrier, and contact restrictions are applied. In Sweden, like 
in other Scandinavian countries and the Netherlands, screening programmes have 
been set up to minimize transmission of pathogenic bacteria and to prevent hospital 
outbreaks. In-hospital restrictions in case of a positive test are quite burdensome, 
involving isolation and intensified hygiene measures (Rump 2016; Socialstyrelsen 
2010). Furthermore, upon release, patients in Sweden are bound by law to take pre-
cautions in their daily life (for instance, with respect to family members (Skyman 
2014). Patients remain registered as a carrier of MRSA, until they repeatedly test 
negative.7
The negative effects of being classified as carrier, especially MRSA carriership, 
and the subsequent contact precautions have been extensively described (Skyman 
2010, 2014; Rump 2016). MDR bacteria are scary, particularly if (as is frequently 
the case in public campaigns and media portrayals) advertised as ‘superbugs’, or 
even ‘killer bugs’. This may impress on individuals the importance of being cautious 
not to transmit this contagion even further. It may also fuel irrational and unneces-
sary fears in both patients and healthcare workers. As a consequence, patients form 
their own strategies to cope with the contagion limiting their social contacts in daily 
life and they may become overly worried, stressed and even depressed (Rump 2016; 
Skyman 2010, 2014). In addition, healthcare providers, family members and society 
as a whole may also respond to a positive test with unfounded fear and anxiety, lead-
ing to discrimination, exclusion and other stigmatizing behaviour (Wiklund et  al. 
2013, 2015; Skyman 2014). It has been documented that patients in contact isolation 
tend to receive less care than patients in general care (Saint et al. 2003; Evans et al. 
Footnote 5 (continued)
for reasons of simplicity—but note that if indeed different considerations apply to VRE, this example 
further supports our argument for differentiation.
6 Universal screening in this context would involve testing every (new) patient in hospital for MDR colo-
nization.
7 In Sweden, three times over a period of 1 year (Socialstyrelsen 2010).
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2003; Stelfox et al. 2003). There are thus real and significant risks and burdens to 
the individual being identified as a carrier of MDR bacteria.
Although the inclusion criteria for MRSA screening aim to detect those who are 
(at a higher risk of) developing symptomatic infection with MRSA, they mostly 
serve to single out those who have become colonized not to transmit this contagion 
to co-patients. Usually carriers are not treated with oral antibiotics, but in MRSA 
carriers, attempts to decolonise patients with a chlorhexidine wash and a nasal anti-
biotic ointment is performed in some healthcare institutions (Henderson 2006). 
However, long-time carriers of MRSA may be treated with broad spectrum antibi-
otics to achieve decolonisation. This may benefit the patient, since it may prevent 
future MRSA symptomatic infections (Verbrugh 2009), but it may also pose a threat 
both to the patient treated, disturbing the gut flora, and to society by driving ABR 
development (Rottier et al. 2015). Nevertheless, on the whole, screening has been 
judged to be sufficiently beneficial to the healthcare institutions involved, and soci-
ety in general (Vriens et al. 2002).
The MRSA screening program, although not universal, is relatively broad, as 
there would otherwise be substantial risk that the program misses cases (where 
patients do not meet inclusion criteria). This increases the running costs and the risk 
of burdens to individuals compared to a more restrictively targeted program. How-
ever, we agree that the importance of responding to ABR, and the effectiveness of 
the screening in this respect means that this measure to prevent nosocomial spread 
of MRSA is proportional. In the next section we will present reasons to doubt that 
this rationale can be extended to the current screening programs for MDRGN.
4  Epidemiological comparison MRSA vs. MDRGN
Our reasons for doubting that a screening program for MDRGN similar to that 
for MRSA is sufficiently effective to be justified in terms of proportionality are 
grounded in a combination of the epidemiological characteristics and general risk 
management contexts of MDRGN in comparison to MRSA.
First, there are differences in the spread of the different types of resistant bacte-
ria concerned. Contrary to MRSA, the MDRGN targeted by current screening pro-
grams typically reside in the gut, and usually do not survive very long outside the 
human body. The risk of nosocomial spread due to colonisation therefore appears 
to be rather low in the absence of diarrhoea (Hilty et al. 2012). This is true in par-
ticular of MDR E. coli, which is by far the most dominant MDRGN.8 Contrary to 
for example staphylococci and enterococci, most MDRGN require moist environ-
ments to survive for a longer period of time outside the human body (Hirai 1991). 
In addition, flakes of skin from MRSA colonised individuals present a high risk of 
nosocomial spread, as does nasal colonisation in combination with sneezing. Also, 
MRSA skin colonisation involves significant risk of indirect spread via the hands 
8 Comprising about 90% of all cases in Sweden (FoHM 2017b).
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of healthcare professionals if not properly disinfected before and after patient care 
(Siegel et al. 2007).9 Since transmission of MRDGN, especially for E. coli, primarily 
occurs through the fecal–oral route, the risk of nosocomial spread is much smaller—
although there are exceptions to this rule, for example when the patient has diar-
rhoea or when there are other risk factors involved that increase the risk of indirect 
spread of MDRGN from the gut flora, such as urinary catheters and gut stoma. We 
will return to these exceptions, and their relevance to high-risk units, later.
Second, identification of an MRSA colonised patient in a hospital is compara-
tively more important from a risk management perspective. The MRSA colonisa-
tion rate in the general community is rather low in Europe (Mölstad et  al. 2017). 
As consequence, when a colonised person enters a hospital, where they will come 
into close contact with others (some of whom especially vulnerable), this marks a 
significant increase of the risk of transmitting MRSA. In contrast, MDRGN colo-
nisation occurs mostly via contaminated food and water, and the rate of commu-
nity colonisation for MDRGN is therefore much higher and steadily increasing, even 
in low endemic settings (Woerther et  al. 2013; Karanika et  al. 2016). This means 
that there will already be a relatively large number of undetected cases of MDRGN 
in the hospital, thereby reducing the risk management significance of identifying a 
few more. Of course, making the screening program universal may address this par-
ticular aspect, but as already explained, this would at the same time add substantial 
downsides in terms of opportunity cost and individual burdens.
A third difference between MRSA and MRDGN concerns the relationship 
between colonization and symptomatic infectious disease. Carriers of MRSA are 
known to have an increased risk of subsequent symtomatic infection (Van Belkum 
and Verbrugh 2001; Nelson et al. 2018), whereas the risk of subsequent symtomatic 
infection in gut carriers of MDRGN is largely unkown (Turbett and Mansour 2016; 
Rottier et  al. 2015; Goulenok et  al. 2013; Boldt et  al. 2018). Recent reports indi-
cate a very low frequency of subsequent symtomatic infection in a large unselected 
patient group of gut carriers (Lindblom et al. 2018; Boldt et al. 2018).10 This is par-
ticularly salient since identification of an MDR carrier status increases the risk of 
broad-spectrum antibiotic overuse, which may have negative consequences for both 
individual and society. Specifically, it increases the likelihood that carbapenems and 
other drugs of ’last resort’are used for empirical treatment of carriers of MDRGN 
(Papp-Wallace et al. 2011; Vardakas et al. 2012) in case of a symptomatic infection 
in these patients until clinical culture results are available determining the actual 
cause of disease. In addition, there is evidence that most MDRGN strains found by 
faecal screening are less virulent and thus less likely to cause symptomatic disease 
(Ny et al. 2016).
9 Of course, MDRGN can be indirectly transmitted via the hands too if the patients have risk factors for 
transmitting MDRGN. However, skin colonization is much more rare for MDRGN than for MRSA.
10 Tischendorf et al. (2016) argue that, in case of colonisation carbapenem resistant enterobactericeae, 
there is a relatively high proportion of subsequent infection. However, this study encompasses a rela-
tively high number of (severely) ill patients in high-risk units, who are at a higher risk of developing 
infection per se. Nonetheless, more research is necessary to establish the risk for different resistant 
strains in different contexts.
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This relates to the next point. The colonisation status in MRSA is ’treatable’, in 
contrast to MDRGN, where attempts to eliminate the carrier status by decolonisa-
tion strategies have been disappointing (Turbett and Mansour 2016). In short, while 
identifying a MRSA carrier may help to prevent infection in addition to second-
ary transmission and hospital outbreaks, and to eventually relieve the patient of the 
colonisation, the identified MDRGN carrier cannot be subjected to either enhanced 
effective infection control unless they have risk factors contributing to spread like 
diarrhoea or to treatments that may decolonise the patient. The only action on offer 
would be contact precautions and isolation that are difficult to motivate either ethi-
cally or in medical terms, other than in high risk units like haematology or ICUs, 
or empirical treatment with last resort antibiotics, which would be unsustainable 
and unjustifiable from an antibiotic stewardship standpoint. As a consequence, the 
dilemma is thus between increasing burdens on patients and institutions in a (rather 
imperfect) attempt to prevent further spread, or accepting the ineffectiveness of the 
screening programme.
Finally, setting up a screening program for MDRGN that would have a chance 
of having some infection prevention effect is complicated by the fact that MDRGN 
resistance is mostly plasmid mediated and several different species are involved. 
This means that resistance traits can be transferred from individual bacteria to other 
individual bacteria, and in rare cases even between species (Bosch et al. 2017; Lind-
blom et  al. 2019). Consequently, to the extent that individuals develop symptoms 
by resistant bacteria due to an MDRGN colonisation, these may not be the bacte-
ria targeted by screening, but rather from other bacteria in their gut adopting the 
same plasmid (Hagel et al. 2019). A potentially effective program would therefore 
have to focus not on particular drug resistant bacteria types, but also on the resistant 
mechanism for early identification of polyclonal outbreaks that may involve inter-
species plasmid migration (Müller et  al. 2016). This complication does not apply 
in the same way to MRSA, since only one species is involved and the resistance 
mechanism in MRSA is chromosomal (Deurenberg et al. 2007; see however Becker 
et al. 2018).
Summarizing, screening for MDRGN in comparison with the current programs 
of MRSA screening will be less effective in at least four ways: (1) secondary trans-
mission from colonised patients without risk factors for transmission like diarrhoea 
is less likely especially in the case of the most common species (E. coli), (2) these 
programs find a smaller proportion of the colonised population since the commu-
nity reservoir is becoming increasingly much larger for MDRGN than MRSA, (3) 
a larger proportion of the identified patients will likely not get sick and an ethically 
justifiable or public health sustainable intervention to reduce infection seems out of 
reach, and (4) such programs present difficulties in targeting the right strain since 
several different bacteria and resistance mechanisms are involved.
Taken together, these observations put into question the justifiability of the 
MDRGN screening regimes currently implemented in several countries, such as 
Sweden and the Netherlands, as these programmes still have the same ethical and 
economical downsides as their MRSA siblings (Wiklund et al. 2013), but lack the 
effectiveness of the latter. This undermines both the proportionality and the justi-
fication of the opportunity costs of the program. A positive diagnosis of MDRGN 
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colonisation will have a significant negative impact on people’s lives, with no or 
very little benefit to either the tested person or to public health. As colonisation of 
MDRGN bacteria increases even more,11 the screening will involve more and more 
people, where each positive case threatens to provide a negative balance of the rea-
sons that might otherwise have supported the programme. In short, more people are 
burdened and even harmed and higher costs are accumulated with weaker justifica-
tion than in the case of MRSA.
None of this is to downplay the seriousness of MDRGN, in general and as a dan-
ger to health care institutions such as hospitals. Also, the arguments presented so far 
are relative to the case for screening for MRSA—the fact that screening for MDRGN 
is less effective than screening for MRSA does not undermine all conceivable types 
MDRGN hospital screening efforts. However, the apparently weak prospect of a suf-
ficient justification for the current MDRGN screening policy provides good reason 
to at least look for better options. In the next section, we sketch an alternative pro-
posal to this effect.
5  Alternatives to the current programme
An alternative to the wide net–small mesh approach copy-pasted from MRSA colo-
nisation screening programs, the differences between MRSA and MRDGN would 
suggest a strategy that change focus from merely detecting colonisation to a more 
specific focus on those groups that are at particular risk of developing symptomatic 
infection, or at specific risk of serious harm in case of MDRGN infection, or where 
infection brings a significant risk of spread. More precisely, the focus should be on 
foreseeing symptomatic infection, preventing outbreak, and preventing serious con-
sequences for patients due to infections. This implies that screening for MDRGN 
should not be viewed as an isolated policy, but rather as one part of a comprehensive 
approach that includes both general and specific primary and secondary prevention 
strategies.
The first action to highlight from that perspective is not screening, but general 
primary prevention. This is important, as it links to the mentioned opportunity costs: 
ineffective screening programs will use resources that could instead be applied to 
ensure that there is less of importance for screening programs to capture in the first 
place. Hospitals and other health care institutions could further enhance measures 
that curb all healthcare associated infections: high compliance to basic hygiene rou-
tines in all care, good toilet and food hygiene, single rooms with toilet to everyone 
in hospital and so on (ECDC 2016; Lemmen and Lewalter 2018). None of these 
measures are of course specific to the approach to MDRGN. Yet, in the context of 
11 In Sweden, at least 5% of the population is currently colonised by MDRGN (Ny et al. 2016; Mölstad 
et al. 2017; Lindblom et al. 2018), but given that some other countries are up to 60% (Woerther et al. 
2013), it seems fair to suppose that the numbers will soon rise well above this already high proportion. 
By contrast, the prevalence of asymptomatic MRSA in the community is estimated to be between 1 and 
2% (Mölstad et al. 2017; Den Heijer 2013).
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assessing whether screening is worthwhile and in what form, they deserve specific 
mention, because they take the focus from finding instances of colonization to pre-
venting infection and transmission of all potential pathogens. This leaves the ques-
tion, what, in this broader context, would be the added value of screening or testing 
for colonization? We submit that there may be reasons to screen patients in some, 
specific circumstances, in order to apply specific primary and secondary prevention 
measures.
Although most MRDGN carriers will not get sick or give rise to dangerous 
spread, empirical treatment in patients with an elevated risk of MDRGN symp-
tomatic infection is lifesaving, and ABR is an independent predictor of mortality 
(Wilson et al. 2016; Goulenok et al. 2013; Rottier et al. 2015; Turbett and Mansour 
2016). In these cases, both the patient and the treating physician will benefit from 
knowing about a possible carrier status in case of subsequent infection episodes. 
Moreover, patients with symptomatic infection generally are much more contagious 
than carriers, for the simple reason that there are more bacteria involved, creating a 
straightforward infection control reason in support of this focus.
One straightforward way to target this group is to simply keep track of those 
already diagnosed with such an infection. Recurrent infection is a well-known phe-
nomenon in patients with urinary tract infections (UTI) due to sensitive E. coli and 
have been reported in approximately 30% of those with a prior UTI or septicaemia 
due to ESBL-producing MDRGN, primarily MDR E. coli (Lindblom et al. 2018). 
In addition, patients with known risk factors for developing disease with MDRGN 
should be screened, such as antibiotic treatment within the last months, urological 
comorbidity, immunosuppression, use of urinary catheters, and those who have had 
a previous MDRGN infection.12
Additionally, there are specific circumstances where the risk of spread in case of 
infection,13 or the seriousness of the consequences of such a spread (haematology, 
transplant and neonatal units, ICUs), creates an immediate infection control reason 
to screen for MRDGN colonisation. Discovering MDRGN colonisation in these 
contexts in order to apply contact precautions or clinical treatment measures in case 
of serious risk would be in the general interest of all patients concerned, and also 
well motivated from a general public health standpoint.
Given that universal screening for MDRGN (or MRSA)—where all people in 
a population, or institution, are screened—is unjustified, a screening program that 
may effectively add to important infection control against a background of sound 
general infection control routines, can be motivated on the basis of proportionality 
and fairness. More specifically, we propose that the current MRDGN screening pro-
grams should be redesigned to target patients:
12 The latter was found to be a strong predictor in patients with sepsis due to MDR E. coli (Fröding et al. 
2019).
13 As mentioned earlier, this applies in particular to high-risk units, where colonization may easily 
spread. This is the case where, for example, catheters, stoma, tracheostoma and drains are used.
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1. Who are at particular risk of developing MDR disease due to MDRGN colonisa-
tion, for instance patients with a history of recent antibiotic treatment, previous 
infection with MDRGN bacteria, urological disorders etc.
2. Who have been directly transferred for further hospitalisation from a hospital in 
a high endemic area,
3. Hospitalized in units where a possible infection would bring significant risks of 
spread and outbreak, and
4. Hospitalized in units where spread will have catastrophic results for all patients 
(including the screened individuals) due to their high risk of developing and 
vulnerability to infections.14
To further increase effectiveness (and reduce ethical downsides), the management 
of positive results in the program should also be reformed. Specifically, healthcare 
providers should be properly informed about MDR bacteria, the risk of spread and 
how to protect themselves and the patients from becoming colonized. Positively 
tested patients should receive the same level of care as others and communication 
should be focused on eliminating stigma. Note that none of these measures are likely 
to be very effective unless there is sufficient knowledge among healthcare profes-
sionals and the public in general on bacterial infections, resistance and the purpose 
of screening. Therefore, any effective approach should be accompanied by active 
information and education efforts. Also, since it is not immediately obvious that the 
individual should pay the costs of the consequences of a positive test, another action 
worthy of serious consideration is to apply compensation schemes to those harmed 
or disadvantaged by restrictions (Rump et al. 2018).
We repeat the importance of the premise that such a screening program assumes 
enhanced efforts to apply hospital infection control across the board. Measures that 
curb all health-related infections, high appliance to basic hygiene routines in all 
care, good toilet and food hygiene, single rooms with toilet to everyone in hospital 
and so on (ECDC 2016) will also curb the threat of MRDGN and reduce the need 
for unnecessarily burdening and costly screening programs.
6  Concluding discussion
We have argued that current routine hospital screening efforts for MDRGN colo-
nisation are relatively ineffective, and that policy should be reformed to emphasize 
the aim of reducing symptomatic MDRGN infection and hospital outbreaks, and 
to apply adequate treatment and infection control measures to this effect. Our pro-
posal mixes a higher emphasis on general primary prevention strategies in hospitals, 
14 Note that this focus on the risk of developing symptomatic infection does not preclude, but rather 
necessitates, the advancement of knowledge concerning the risk of subsequent infection in MDRGN 
carriers in general and selected patient populations. (Lindblom et al. 2018; Turbett and Mansour 2016). 
There is also a need to relate the risk to the different species within the category MDRGN, knowing that 
some of these species are more dangerous or more likely to spread than others in a hospital setting.
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a more focused screening program for MDRGN colonisation, and more measured 
actions in case of positive test results that may address known risk of stigma and 
unnecessary intrusion for patients. This reform would address both the justification 
of the opportunity costs of the policy, its ethical downsides, and its overall prospect 
of justification.15
Screening is ethically complicated due to the, often considerable, general costs 
and ethical downsides of screening programmes (Juth and Munthe 2012). Screen-
ing for infection control reasons tends to add additional stress on this complexity, 
as there is often no clear prospect of benefit at all to positively tested individuals 
(Nijsingh et al. 2017). But the ABR context is different from other public health and 
infection control dilemmas in several respects (Rump et al. 2018). This affects the 
ethical analysis of screening for the aim of antibiotic stewardship. ABR has been 
described as a slowly emerging crisis or disaster for health systems and health-
care (Viens and Littmann 2015), and will certainly affect healthcare institutions 
and many patients in profound ways. It is also a chronic problem, in the sense that 
there is not likely to be a quick solution and societies will have to find ways to adapt 
to this challenge. This calls not only for swift action to curb serious threats at the 
population and institutional levels, but also for sustainable policy that is well justi-
fied from an ethical standpoint, and that can inspire necessary political and popular 
legitimacy. Our analysis of current routine hospital screening programs for MDRGN 
colonisation illustrates the importance of not being lured into rash measures by the 
massive stakes of the ABR challenge, but to consider the actual effectiveness of each 
step in proposed policies in light of their (inescapable) ethical downsides and prag-
matic risks.
Our argument illustrates that the consideration of such effectiveness is not lim-
ited to simple trade-offs between individual and collective interests of the sort often 
highlighted in public health and screening ethics. Rather, in the ABR context, ade-
quately designed screening programmes can be part of what it means for a hospital 
(and health system) to deliver good care, both for the patient who is screened and 
those who are at risk of actual MDR disease. We have argued that, in the case of 
MDRGN colonisation, a more measured and focused hospital policy would also be 
easier to justify in this way.
There remains in our proposal the ethical downside of screening without col-
lection of informed consent. In some public health ethical recommendations, such 
as the so-called intervention ladder of the Nuffield Council of Bioethics (Nuffield 
2007), providing choice for concerned parties is a highly prioritized aspect of public 
health interventions, and severely restricting choice, or eliminating it altogether, is 
viewed as last resort option when stakes are extreme. We agree with Dawson (2016) 
15 Of course, the proof of the eating is in the pudding. Any screening programme will need continuous 
monitoring in order to verify its effectiveness. We do not claim that our approach has no downsides of its 
own or even that it is superior to all alternatives regardless of context. However, there seem to be strong 
reasons, based in empirical observations, to prefer our alternative to the current programmes. Future 
research will need to provide more evidence on for example the risk of colonisation leading to either 
symptomatic infection, or transmission, the possibility of successful and safe treatment of colonised indi-
viduals and value of more comprehensive testing as MDR bacteria become more prevalent.
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that this one-dimensional way of “prioritizing liberty” fails to capture the main aims 
and values of public health policy and action, and how they interplay with other 
ethical considerations. While we do agree that considerations of individual liberty 
should play a part in the justification of public health policy and action, it should 
not be given a rigid superior priority relative to all other values, but considered in 
proportion to the way in which public health actions many times serve to protect 
the opportunities of all people by furthering general health goals and institutions of 
structural importance (Munthe 2008). While individual rights have a central place 
in a public health ethical framework, these need to consider the role of population 
health and linked social institutions to facilitate the effective discharging everyone’s 
equal rights across time. If ABR is not controlled and managed well, it threatens 
to undermine the entire system of effective modern healthcare within which the 
patient’s right to choose is supposed to be operating. For similar reasons, a principle 
of subsidiarity (urging that power over decisions should not be unnecessarily cen-
tralized) would not speak against well-balanced screening programs for ABR colo-
nization in hospitals (Kotalik 2010).
The argument we have developed for our proposed reform of hospital MDRGN 
prevention policy, including screening focused on prevention and treatment of actual 
disease and outbreak, illustrates this. Lack of choice can be motivated from an ethi-
cal standpoint if sufficient antibiotic stewardship effectiveness is ensured, consider-
ing scientific, ethical and pragmatic aspects. Adding procedures to preserve some 
sort of token recognition of individual liberty (such as information about the option 
to leave the hospital rather than take the test) would not be meaningful from a practi-
cal or theoretical perspective, not even from a perspective of individual rights.
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